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McNeilly, Mark R. Sun Tzu and the Art of Business: Six Strategic Principles for Managers. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. 330pp. $19.95

Two millennia ago, the original author
of Sun Tzu’s Art of War presumably
never intended the work to be applied to the twenty-first-century global
marketplace. However, Mark McNeilly
has taken the liberty of doing so. In a
novel approach, he has compiled a list
of strategic concepts derived from the
ancient military strategist and translated
them into a lexicon for modern corporate capitalists. Sun Tzu and the Art
of Business is a guidebook for business
managers looking to increase profitability for the sake of their companies
and their employees. The book was
originally published in 1996 but has
been revised to address the influence of
globalization, the increased use of the
Internet, the increase in cooperative alliances, and the economic rise of China.
McNeilly, a former infantry officer and
corporate strategist, derives six principles from Sun Tzu’s philosophy that,
if followed, will yield business success.
The prescriptive list consists of winning
without fighting—capturing your market
without destroying it; avoiding strength,
attacking weakness—striking where
they least expect it; employing deception and foreknowledge—maximizing
the power of market information; using
speed and preparation—moving swiftly
to overcome your competitors; shaping
your opponent—employing strategy to
master your opponent; and displaying
character-based leadership—providing
effective leadership in turbulent times.
McNeilly assumes there are natural
parallels between ancient warfare
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and modern commerce. For example,
battlefield victory is likened to market share and industry dominance. In
order to validate his points, the author
juxtaposes numerous business case
studies with military history. While
certainly engaging, some of the parallels seem oversimplified and lacking
in critical analysis. The inclusion of so
many case studies tends to minimize
the complexities of each one, and when
taken out of context, the case studies
become almost trivialized. There is also
little discussion on risk assessment or
how one’s enemy or competitor may
react to each of the principles outlined.
For those who want a simple approach
to applying military strategy to the
competitive marketplace, this book
achieves that objective. It is an enjoyable and quick read, written in a style
that is brisk and easy to follow. Included
is a practical section designed to help
readers develop and apply a business
approach. What readers may find especially helpful is the inclusion of Samuel
B. Griffith’s translation of Sun Tzu’s
The Art of War and a list of references
for further study. Overall, this work
may appeal more to a general audience
than to serious students of strategy.
CDR. JUDY MALANA, U.S. NAVY

Naval War College

Wiarda, Howard. Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: A Clash of
Cultures. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011.
176pp. $60

Howard Wiarda’s memoir of his time at
the National War College is a startling book. During nearly a decade of
teaching in the professional military
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education (PME) program at the
National Defense University (NDU),
Wiarda amassed anecdotes that point to
dire flaws in the way military education is conducted in the United States.
Unfortunately, the book is a missed
opportunity. Every professor who has
worked at a war college will recognize the stories Wiarda tells and can
likely match many of them. However,
because the book is written in the tone
of an angry tell-all rather than with
the detachment of a scholarly volume,
too many legitimate points will be too
quickly dismissed, especially by the
most entrenched elements in PME,
who are rightly the focus of Wiarda’s
criticisms. This is all the more regrettable because these are not the gripes of
a disaffected or failed academic. Howard
Wiarda’s expertise and reputation are
beyond question, and the government
was fortunate to have him teaching U.S.
military officers. Alas, if only NDU had
felt that way about him and the other
civilian scholars who have worked there.
Wiarda shows that he and other civilian
academics at the National War College,
a school within NDU, were treated by
the administration as little better than
irritants, necessary evils to be endured.
Senior leaders at NDU cared little for
education and not at all for scholarship. Their attitude toward the civilian
faculty veered from benign neglect to
sneering disdain, which sometimes
manifested itself in weird ways. In one
example, Wiarda was hauled into the
commandant’s office one morning
after attending a reception and told
he should not be “socializing above
his rank,” whatever that means.
Among these sometimes comical
stories (a note to National’s faculty:
don’t ever park in the commandant’s
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spot), Wiarda is making a serious point
about a common problem in all PME
institutions—the people in charge of
education are not actually educators.
Wiarda provides this blistering description, for example, of the kind of
president who is “the bane of NDU’s
colleges and institutes”: a “heavyhanded one, full of fire and brimstone,
who thinks he/she knows everything
there is to know about military education or even education in general,
wants to change and reform the entire
institution, and especially seeks to
put ‘those independent professors’
in their place. He/she will usually
spend a year or two instituting grand,
sweeping changes, fulminating at the
scholars and teachers, and wondering
why his reforms are not carried out.”
This general hostility to the faculty
and the educational enterprise has
deep roots. Wiarda writes that in
military culture, senior officers are
taught that they are good at everything, especially anything civilians
can do. Worse, any disagreement with
these senior military leaders triggers
what Wiarda accurately sees as a huge
intellectual inferiority complex.
This insecurity not only makes officers
more difficult to educate but warps
the priorities of the institution toward
an obsession with student happiness rather than educational results.
The idea that the faculty should teach
and the students should learn clearly
chafed Wiarda’s superiors, who saw
education as far less important than
protecting the well-being (and fragile egos) of the officers at NDU.
Here Wiarda is merciless in his description of the students as “pandered to”
and “pampered.” He provides plenty of
material to support that description,
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including the virtual impossibility of
failing students for any reason. Wiarda
was told, as all PME faculty have been
for years, that the students were his
peers, an assertion that Wiarda found
“laughable.” Nor was it true. Wiarda
shows that the students were actually
treated as his superiors and that he was
expected to serve them accordingly.
Academics, for their part, have no
understanding of the military obsession
with hierarchy and procedure—also a
point Wiarda mentions. Yet in this toobrief volume, the author does not explore either culture as much as his title
promises. Too much space is taken up
with anecdotes and score settling at the
expense of discussing remedies, the stories and problems being presented without priority. In one example, Wiarda is
absolutely right to decry the often sadistic manipulation of faculty contracts
by some of the martinets for whom he
worked. This is a widespread problem
in the PME world. More time discussing
the pressing need for a tenure system
in PME, however, and less complaining
about distractions (like student parking) might have been more productive.
There are other problems with the
book as well. Although short, it is
poorly edited—indeed, it seems not
to have been edited at all. The same
anecdotes appear again in different
places, sections overlap, and there are
avoidable lapses in grammar and spelling. An entire chapter, about Wiarda’s
international travels while working for
NDU, is out of place and disposable.
Nonetheless, the book’s flaws do not
obscure the reality of the problem.
Successful and highly regarded educators from every major PME institution
—including George Reed, Dan Hughes,
Judith Stiehm, and Joan Johnson-Freese,
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among others—have stepped forward
and written about the same issues.
While Wiarda’s narrative is flawed in
tone, it is still an important step in
illuminating serious and continuing
problems in the PME community.
THOMAS NICHOLS

Naval War College

Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making, 1805–1927.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011. 345pp.
$120

This book explores the history of the
development of naval policy making
in the British Admiralty from 1805
to 1927, from the Battle of Trafalgar
to the aftermath of World War I.
The author, C. I. Hamilton, a professor of modern European history at the
University of the Witwatersrand, writes
that he first became interested in this
subject because he wished to know who
did what at the Admiralty and how
they did it. Reading this book answers
those questions and introduces a rich
tapestry of interesting historical characters and complex naval policy issues.
Although the book paints an analytically cohesive picture of naval policy
issues that plagued would-be planners
for over a century, it also contains many
colorful historical details. Beginning
in 1805 with Lord Barham, who at
age eighty could run the navy almost
single-handedly from his desk, the book
deals authoritatively with thorny issues
of naval administration and policy.
Many fascinating professional and
civilian characters appear in this period.
Only naval historians may initially recognize some, but there are many other
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